t the May 2004 meeting, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) introduced the phrase "policy accommodation can be removed at a pace that is likely to be measured" into the statement it makes at the conclusion of each meeting. The "measured pace" language, which was repeated in the next 12 statements, became widely regarded as a signal that the FOMC would raise the funds rate target by 25 basis points at its next meeting. This language was modified at the December 2005 meeting and discontinued at this year's January meeting. Now that that experience is over, it is useful to consider the extent to which policymakers should signal their next policy action.
The "measured pace" language appears to be a product of the economic conditions that accompanied it. Beginning in January 2001, on evidence that the economy was weakening and that inflation was contained, the FOMC began to ease policy: The Committee reduced the federal funds target from 6.5 percent to 1.75 percent in 2001 and again in 2002 and 2003 to the historically low level of 1 percent. The 1 percent rate was well below anyone's estimate of the so-called "neutral" nominal rate-the real interest rate (which is independent of monetary policy) plus the FOMC's implicit objective for inflation. It was understood that a 1 percent funds rate was not sustainable. Faced with strong productivity growth and no evidence of deteriorating inflation expectations, the FOMC decided to increase the target at a "measured pace."
While signaling the timing and magnitude of the next funds rate target change appears to have been useful under these unusual circumstances, it is unlikely to be useful in others, particularly when the difference between the target and estimated neutral rates is relatively small. The neutral nominal rate changes over time and is subject to considerable uncertainty. Consequently, it is difficult to determine or predict; furthermore, in circumstances where the difference between the target and estimated neutral rates is smaller than it has been in recent years, policymakers may be uncertain whether the target will need to be increased, decreased, or maintained at the next meeting. Indeed, it is not surprising that the measured pace language was phased out when the target rate got closer to a level that some analysts considered "neutral."
Signaling the policy action at the next meeting is further complicated by the fact that the current level of the policy rate incorporates policymakers' best guess of the future state of the economy. Even if policymakers' expectations are correct on average, what will occur by the time of any particular meeting is not perfectly forecastable. This could make policymakers understandably reluctant to decide on the action they'll take at the next meeting before they receive information about the accuracy of their current expectations.
There may be situations where policymakers believe they can achieve a particular objective by increasing or decreasing the funds rate by x percentage points over a period of time and, thereby, signal the direction and magnitude of the policy action at the next meeting. For example, fearing recession, policymakers might believe that the target may be reduced slowly by some cumulative amount. In such a circumstance, the direction of the next move might be predictable, but the magnitude would likely be less so. Moreover, the further the target gets below the estimated neutral rate, the more wary policymakers will be of signaling a reduction at the next meeting, preferring instead to examine the behavior of inflation indicators between meetings before deciding whether a further reduction is advisable.
That the FOMC may find it difficult, and consequently unadvisable, to signal the next policy action does not prevent the Committee from providing "forward guidance"-a statement of the Committee's thinking based on the information available at the time of the meeting and the Committee's expectation of what might happen. Forward guidance is not a commitment. The Committee would act in accordance with its forward guidance only if the Committee's expectation of what might happen actually occurred. Indeed, as argued in Poole (1999) , transparency of this sort likely enhances the efficacy of monetary policy. Percent change from year ago M2   -5   0   5   10   15   1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007   89  90  91  92  93  94  95  96  97  98  99  00  01  02  03  04  05  06 Percent change from year ago MZM M1
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Inflation and Inflation Expectations
The shaded region shows the Humphrey-Hawkins CPI inflation range. Beginning in January 2000, the Humphrey-Hawkins inflation range was reported using the PCE price index and therefore is not shown on this graph. See notes on page 19. Percent change from year ago
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Dashed lines indicate 10-year moving averages. Percent change from year ago
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Dashed lines indicate 10-year moving averages. MZM (money, zero maturity): M2 minus small-denomination time deposits, plus institutional money market mutual funds (that is, those included in M3 but excluded from M2). The label MZM was coined by William Poole (1991) ; the aggregate itself was proposed earlier by Motley (1988) .
M2: M1 plus savings deposits (including money market deposit accounts) and small-denomination (under $100,000) time deposits issued by financial institutions; and shares in retail money market mutual funds (funds with initial investments under $50,000), net of retirement accounts.
M3:
M2 plus large-denomination ($100,000 or more) time deposits; repurchase agreements issued by depository institutions; Eurodollar deposits, specifically, dollar-denominated deposits due to nonbank U.S. addresses held at foreign offices of U.S. banks worldwide and all banking offices in Canada and the United Kingdom; and institutional money market mutual funds (funds with initial investments of $50,000 or more).
Bank Credit: All loans, leases, and securities held by commercial banks.
Domestic Nonfinancial Debt:
Total credit market liabilities of the U.S. Treasury, federally sponsored agencies, state and local governments, households, and nonfinancial firms. End-of-period basis.
Adjusted Monetary Base:
The sum of currency in circulation outside Federal Reserve Banks and the U.S. Treasury, deposits of depository financial institutions at Federal Reserve Banks, and an adjustment for the effects of changes in statutory reserve requirements on the quantity of base money held by depositories. This series is a spliced chain index; see Anderson and Rasche (1996a ,b, 2001 , 2003 .
Adjusted Reserves:
The sum of vault cash and Federal Reserve Bank deposits held by depository institutions and an adjustment for the effects of changes in statutory reserve requirements on the quantity of base money held by depositories. This spliced chain index is numerically larger than the Board of Governors' measure, which excludes vault cash not used to satisfy statutory reserve requirements and Federal Reserve Bank deposits used to satisfy required clearing balance contracts; see Anderson and Rasche (1996a , 2001 , 2003 .
Monetary Services Index:
An index that measures the flow of monetary services received by households and firms from their holdings of liquid assets; see Anderson, Jones, and Nesmith (1997) . Indexes are shown for the assets included in M2, with additional data at research.stlouisfed.org/msi/index.html. 
to five alternative target inflation rates, π * = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 percent, where f t * is the implied federal funds rate, π t -1 is the previous period's inflation rate (PCE) measured on a year-over-year basis, y t -1 is the log of the previous period's level of real gross domestic product (GDP), and y t -1 P is the log of an estimate of the previous period's level of potential output. Potential Real GDP is as estimated by the Congressional Budget Office.
Monetary Base Growth and Inflation Targets shows the quarterly growth of the adjusted monetary base (modified to include an estimate of the effect of sweep programs) implied by applying McCallum's (1988 McCallum's ( , 1993 
equation
ΔMB t * = π * + (10-year moving average growth of real GDP)
-(4-year moving average of base velocity growth)
to five alternative target inflation rates, π * = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 percent, where ΔMB t * is the implied growth rate of the adjusted monetary base. The 10-year moving average growth of real GDP for a quarter t is calculated as the average quarterly growth during the previous 40 quarters, at an annual rate, by the formula ((y t -y t -40 )/40) × 400, where y t is the log of real GDP. The 4-year moving average of base velocity growth is calculated similarly. To adjust the monetary base for the effect of retail-deposit sweep programs, we add to the monetary base an amount equal to 10 percent of the total amount swept, as estimated by the Federal Reserve Board staff. These estimates are imprecise, at best. Sweep program data are found at research.stlouisfed.org/aggreg/swdata.html.
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Research Page 12: Velocity (for MZM and M2) equals the ratio of GDP, measured in current dollars, to the level of the monetary aggregate. MZM and M2 Own Rates are weighted averages of the rates received by households and firms on the assets included in the aggregates. Prior to 1982, the 3-month T-bill rates are secondary market yields. From 1982 forward, rates are 3-month constant maturity yields.
Page 13: Real Gross Domestic Product is GDP as measured in chained 2000 dollars. The Gross Domestic Product Price Index is the implicit price deflator for GDP, which is defined by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce, as the ratio of GDP measured in current dollars to GDP measured in chained 2000 dollars.
